Paternalism and Nudge Theory
The subject of paternalism in nudge theory remains a debated one, for the most part because paternalism remains an objectionable position in some circles. I do not offer a comprehensive dissection of what paternalism is. This article is far less ambitious: I merely wish to discuss the role of paternalism as it has classically be discussed and debated in nudge theory. I will assume, on occasion, some degree of background knowledge.
Two definitions of paternalism are given by Thaler and Sunstein. Thaler and Sunstein (2003, p. 175) write:
“In our understanding, a policy counts as “paternalistic” if it is selected with the goal of influencing the choices of affected parties in a way that will make those parties better off. We intend “better off” to be measured as objectively as possible.”
By contrast, Thaler and Sunstein (2008, p. 5) write:
“In our understanding, a policy is “paternalistic” if it tries to influence choices in a way that will make choosers better off, as judged by themselves” (original emphasis).
This change in how “better off” is determined borrows from Van De Veer (1986). The immediate question which emerges from this contrast is: how can the judgments of decision-makers be determined, such that this 2008 understanding of paternalism can be achieved? After all, Thaler and…
